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This  paper  models  trade  as  a  non-coopertative,  strategic  game  played  at  an 
inlinite  sequence  of  dates.  A  single,  indivisible  commodity  is  traded.  Buyers  and 
sellers  have  transferable  utility  and  are  characterized  by  their  reservation  utilities. 
They  meet  at  random  and  “bargain”  over  the  price  at  which  a  single  unit  of  the 
good  will  be  exchanged.  Under  a  variety  of  circumstances  it  is  shown  that  as  the 
costs  of  search  and  bargaining  become  negligible,  the  outcome  of  the  game 
converges  to  the  competitve  (flow)  equilibrium,  even  when  there  is  complete 
information.  Journal  of  Economic  Literature  Classification  Numbers:  022.  ’  19x7 
Academic  Press.  Inc. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Stock  markets,  commodity  futures  markets,  and  a few other  well-known 
types  of markets  are  characterized  by  centralized  trading.  In  these  markets, 
traders  gather  in  a  single  location  and  all  have  access to  the  same  trading 
opportunities.  But  there  are  really  very  few markets  in  which  trading  can 
be  described  as  completely  centralized.  In  many  more,  trading  is  decen- 
tralized.  Yet  economists  tend  to  ignore  these  institutional  differences  and 
apply  the  Walrasian  model  of  competitive  equilibrium,  even  in  decen- 
tralized  markets,  if  certain  general  conditions  are  met.  The  conditions 
themselves  are  familiar  enough.  There  must  be  a  large  number  of 
individually  insignificant  agents.  Agents  must  have  symmetric  information 
about  the  commodities  being  traded.  There  must  be  no  transaction  costs. 
And  so on.  As a convenient  shorthand,  markets  satisfying  these  conditions 
are  referred  to  as frictionless.  The  conventional  wisdom,  then,  is  that  fric- 
tionless  markets  are  competitive  and  the  conventional  practice  is  to  use 
Walrasian  models  to  analyse  them.  It  is an  interesting  question  whether  the 
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Walrasian  equilibrium  is  a  good  approximation  to  what  goes  on  in  all 
frictionless  markets. 
This  question  has  been  given  a  sharper  point  by  recent  work  which 
suggests  that,  in  models  of  decentralized  trade,  the  outcome  is  not 
Walrasian  even  when  all  frictions  are  removed.  The  literature  on  decen- 
tralized  trade  includes  work  by  Diamond  [3,4],  Mortensen  [9,  lo], 
Rubinstein-Wolinsky  (RW)  [13],  Binmore-Herrero  [ 1, 21,  Shaked  Sutton 
[14],  and  Mandel  [S].  What  all  these  contributions  have  in  common  is 
the  assumption  that  trade  is  conducted  between  pairs  of  agents.  These 
agents  are  assumed  to  meet  at  random  and  bargain  over  the  terms  on 
which  they  will  trade.  Diamond  and  Mortensen  preceded  the  others  but 
their  analysis  was,  in  one  important  respect,  ad  hoc.  They  assumed  that 
when  a pair  of agents  met,  the  division  of the  gains  from  trade  was gover- 
ned  by  the  Nash  Bargaining  Solution.  The  justification  for  this  assumption 
is  not  obvious  and  one  might  reasonably  suspect  that  it  alone  accounted 
for  the  non-Walrasian  outcome.  A  more  convincing  argument  was  put 
forward  by  RW,  who  were  the  first  to  highlight  this  paradoxical  result. 
They  adopted  a strategic  approach.  They  modeled  decentralized  trade  as a 
non-cooperative  game  and  analysed  the  perfect  equilibria  of  the  game. 
Since  their  analysis  is  crucial  to  an  understanding  of  everything  that 
follows,  it  is worth  sketching  the  outlines  of it  here. 
One  interpretation  of the  RW  model,  though  not  the  only  one,  is  that  it 
represents  the  market  for  an  indivisible  commodity.  Trade  takes  place  at  an 
infinite  sequence  of dates.  At  each  date  there  is a large  number  of identical 
buyers  and  identical  sellers  in  the  market.  Each  seller  has  one  unit  to  dis- 
pose  oc  each  buyer  wants  to  buy  at  most  one  unit.  Buyers  and  sellers  are 
randomly  matched  in  pairs  at  each  date.  In  any  given  period  an  agent 
either  will  meet  no  one  or  will  meet  exactly  one  agent  of the  opposite  type. 
RW  take  these  matching  probabilities  to  be  primitives  of  the  model.  In 
most  economic  applications,  however,  these  probabilities  will  be 
endogenous.  And  in  the  application  of  their  model  to  the  analysis  of  a 
market  RW  make  the  probabilities  a  function  of the  numbers  of agents  of 
each  type.  If  there  are  more  buyers  than  sellers,  for  example,  a  buyer’s 
probability  of being  matched  is  less than  a  seller’s 
Buyers  and  sellers  remain  in  the  market  until  they  have  traded.  Then 
they  leave  the  market.  At  any  date  the  number  of successful buyers  leaving 
the  market  is  necessarily  equal  to  the  number  of sellers.  In  order  to  main- 
tain  a  stationary  state,  in  which  matching  probabilities  are  constant  over 
time,  equal  numbers  of  buyers  and  sellers  must  enter  the  market  at  each 
date.  The  numbers  of  buyers  and  sellers  in  the  market,  by  contrast,  are 
constant  but  unequal  in  a  stationary  state. 
All  agents  are assumed  to  have  transferable  utilities.  Since  all  buyers  and 
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from  trade  between  buyer  and  seller  to  equal  unity.  When  a  buyer  and 
seller  meet  they  face  the  classical  bargaining  problem:  how  to  divide  this 
unit-sized  cake.  This  problem  has  been  solved  in  a  two-person  framework 
by  Rubenstein  [ 111. His  theory  is easily  extended  to  the  present  case where 
agents  meet  at  random.  Consider  a  buyer  and  seller  who  have  just  met. 
One  of  them  is  chosen  at  random  to  be  the  proposer;  the  other 
automatically  becomes  the  responder. The  proposer  makes  a proposal  as to 
how  the  cake  should  be  divided.  The  responder  responds  by  accepting  or 
rejecting  the  proposal.  If  he  accepts,  the  proposal  is  implemented 
immediately.  The  agents  exchange  a  single  unit  of the  commodity,  divide 
the  surplus  in  the  agreed  manner  and  leave  the  market.  If  he  rejects  the 
proposal  both  agents  are  required  to  remain  passive  until  the  next  date.  At 
the  next  date,  before  bargaining  can  resume,  one  or  both  of the  agents  may 
meet  a new partner.  If  this  happens,  the  newly  matched  agent  will  abandon 
his  old  partner  in  favor  of the  new one.  If  neither  agent  has  been  matched 
with  a new partner  they  are  free to  resume  bargaining.  In  this  way,  agents 
bargain  and  search  until  at  last  they  reach  agreement  with  an  agent  of the 
opposite  type  and  leave  the  market. 
There  is  one  crucial  assumption  which  has  not  yet  been  mentioned. 
Search  and  bargaining  are  costly.  More  precisely,  agents  are  assumed  to 
discount  future  utilities.  The  longer  it  takes  them  to  reach  agreement  the 
smaller,  other  things  being  equal,  their  final  payoffs  will  be.  This  cost 
represents  an  important  source  of  friction  in  the  market  and  one  should 
not  expect  a  Walrasian  outcome  as  long  as  there  is  positive  discounting. 
The  relevant  question  is  what  happens  as  the  rate  of  time  preference 
approaches  zero. 
The  exogenous  matching  process  and  the  rules  governing  pair-wise 
bargaining  together  define  a non-cooperative  game  in  extensive  form.  ’  The 
appropriate  solution  concept  is  the  (subgame)  perfect  equilibrium.  RW 
make  one  further  restriction:  they  require  the  perfect  equilibrium  to  be 
quasi-stationary.  That  is, the  population  of agents  in  the  market  is constant 
over  time,  their  strategies  do  not  depend  on  time  in  an  essential  way  and 
they  are  independent  of  history  in  the  sense  that  an  agent’s  action  at  a 
given  date  depends  only  on  his  current  state  and  not  on  what  happened  in 
previous  periods.  RW  show that  when  there  is positive  discounting  there  is 
r Strictly  speaking,  the  Rubinstein-Wolinsky  framework  does  not  constitute  an  “extensive 
form.”  For  example,  their  game  has  no  initial  nodes.  There  seems  to  be  no  danger  in  using  the 
term  “extensive  form”  to  describe  their  setup,  however,  since  these  details  hardly  obtrude  into 
the  analysis.  Similarly,  it  is  slightly  inaccurate  to  use  the  term  “subgame  perfect  equilibrium” 
to  describe  the  solution  concept.  The  reason  is  that  strategies  are  not  defined  for  certain 
possible  but  economically  irrelevant  nodes  of  the  game.  Again,  there  seems  to  be  no  real  harm 
in  using  the  term  “subgame  perfect  equilibrium”  in  this  context  and  1  think  most  readers  will 
find  it  more  descriptive  of  what  is  going  on  than  the  available  alternatives. LIMIT  THEOREMS  23 
a  unique,  quasi-stationary,  perfect  equilibrium.  The  agents’  payoffs  are 
determined  by  their  relative  impatience  and  the  matching  probabilities. 
More  precisely,  it  is  the  ratio  of  their  respective  rates  of  time  preference 
which  determines  the  payoff,  not  the  absolute  levels.  Allowing  their  respec- 
tive  rates  of  time  preference  to  converge  to  zero  and  holding  the  ratio 
constant  does  not  change  their  relative  shares. 
This  result  is  the  basis  of  RW’s  critique  of  the  competitive  paradigm. 
Here  is a model  which  satisfies  all  the  requirements  of a frictionless  market. 
According  to  the  conventional  wisdom,  the  outcome  of  any  reasonable 
theory  of price  formation  should,  under  these  conditions,  be the  Walrasian 
equilibrium.  And  yet,  they  observe,  this  is  patently  not  the  case.  A 
Walrasian  equilibrium  requires  that  if  there  are  more  sellers  than  buyers 
the  price  should  fall  to  zero.  Conversely  if  there  are  more  buyers  than 
sellers  the  price  should  equal  unity.  In  short,  the  agents  on  the  long  side  of 
the  market  should  receive  a zero  payoff.  But  the  outcome  of the  bargaining 
game  will  always  assign  a  positive  payoff  to  buyers  and  sellers  as long  as 
the  ratio  of their  rates  of time  preference  is positive  and  finite. 
Other  examples  of non-Walrasian  equilibria  in  frictionless  markets  have 
been  given  by  Shaked-Sutton  [15]  and  Mandel  [S].  In  the  present  paper, 
however,  I  am  only  concerned  with  the  result  of RW. 
The  RW  paradox  does  not  arise  in  all  models  of  exchange.  In  [6]  I 
studied  a  general,  exchange  economy  and  showed  that  a  perfect 
equilibrium  of  the  corresponding  bargaining  game  always  implements  a 
Walrasian  equilibrium  of the  underlying  economy.  (An  earlier  version  [.5] 
introduced  the  analytical  methods  on  which  [7]  and  the  present  paper  are 
based.  The  conclusion  of that  paper  was more  or  less the  same  as  [6]  but 
applied  to  steady-state  equilibria  only).  There  are  three  major  differences 
between  the  model  I  studied  in  [6]  and  the  one  used  by  RW.”  First,  there 
is  no  discounting.  Rather  than  assuming  some  positive  degree  of  dis- 
counting  and  then  taking  limits,  I  chose  to  work  directly  with  the  limiting 
economy.  Second,  commodities  are  assumed  to  be  divisible.  As  a  result 
there  is  no  reason  why  an  agent  should  not  trade  with  many  other  agents. 
In  the  RW  model  sketched  above  the  existence  of a single  indivisible  com- 
modity  means  that  each  agent  can  trade  only  once.  Third,  instead  of con- 
sidering  a stationary  state  I  took  the  flow of agents  into  the  economy  to  be 
fixed  but  arbitrary,  subject  to  the  important  qualification  that  the  total 
measure  of agents  entering  the  market  be  finite.  This  last  condition  has the 
important  implication  that  the  set  of  all  agents  entering  the  market  con- 
* In  addition  to  the  differences  arising  from  the  detinition  of  the  model  I  should  mention 
two  assumptions  required  for  the  proof  of  the  theorem.  The  first  imposed  certain  regularity 
conditions  on  utility  functions  (smoothness,  concavity,  etc.).  The  second  required  that  at  each 
date  the  distribution  of  agents’  types  should  have  a  diffuse  support,  It  now  appears  that  this 
last  assumption,  though  needed  for  the  proof  given  in  [7],  is  not  necessary  for  the  result, 24  DOUGLAS  GALE 
stitutes  a well-defined  exchange  economy.  We  can  therefore  talk  about  the 
Walrasian  equilibria  of  that  economy.  In  a  stationary  state,  with  a  con- 
stant,  positive  measure  of agents  entering  at  each  date,  the  set of all  agents 
necessarily  has  infinite  measure.  One  cannot  speak  of  a  Walrasian 
equilibrium  for  the  economy  consisting  of  all  these  agents.  Instead,  RW 
and  others  consider  the  Walrasian  equilibria  of the  hypothetical  economy 
comprising  just  the  agents  in  the  economy  at  a single  date.  This,  as we shall 
see, is  not  at  all  the  same  thing. 
Apart  from  these  differences,  the  spirit  of the  model  presented  in  [6]  was 
the  same  as  the  one  presented  by  RW.  In  particular,  the  rules  of  the 
bargaining  game  were the  same3  once  allowance  was made  for  the  fact  that 
[6]  treats  a  general,  exchange  economy.  So  now we have  two,  apparently 
contradictory,  results.  On  the  one  hand,  we have  a rather  general  model  of 
decentralized  exchange  whose  perfect  equilibria  are  all  Walrasian.  On  the 
other  hand,  we have  several  small  models  whose perfect  equilibria  are  non- 
Walrasian  even  in  the  limit  as  the  frictions  generated  by  discounting 
become  small.  The  central,  unresolved  issue  is  what  accounts  for  the  dif- 
ference  between  these  cases and,  following  on  that,  how  robust  is  each  of 
them? 
There  are  three  possible  answers  to  this  question,  corresponding  to  the 
three  principal  differences  between  the  models  used  in  [6]  and  in  [7]. 
First,  it  is  possible  that  a  limit  theorem  gives  a  different  answer  from  a 
theorem  “in  the  limit.”  In  other  words,  there  is a discontinuity  at  the  point 
where  the  rate  of time  preference  equals  zero.  Second,  it  may  be  that  the 
indivisibilities  in  the  non-Walrasian  models  are  at  the  root  of the  paradox. 
Third,  it  could  be  the  difference  between  stationary  state  models  with  an 
infinite  measure  of agents  and  non-stationary  models  with  a finite  measure 
of  agents  which  accounts  for  the  non-Walrasian  outcome.  In  order  to 
resolve  the  central  issue  we  need  to  analyze  all  three  possibilities.  That 
analysis  is  the  substance  of this  paper. 
The  model  I  use  is  a  generalization  of  the  RW  model.  It  represents  a 
market  for  a single  commodity.  Once  again  agents  are  of two  types,  buyers 
or  sellers,  but  agents  may  be  distinguished  by  their  reservation  or  limit 
prices.  If  all  sellers  (resp.  buyers)  are  assumed  to  have  the  same  reservation 
price  (resp.  limit  price)  then  the  model  collapses  to  the  RW  model.  At  the 
other  extreme,  by  having  a large  number  of finely  graduated  reservation  or 
limit  prices  one  can  approximate  arbitrarily  closely  a  market  with  con- 
tinuous  demand  and  supply  curves.  Thus,  even  though  each  agent  wishes 
3 Rubinstein  [13]  has  suggested  that  the  bargaining  in  [7]  has  a  “take  it  or  leave  it” 
character  which  is  different  from  the  sequential  bargaining  in  RW.  In  [7]  it  is  assumed  that 
agents  are  rematched  each  period,  so  that  at  most  a  single  offer  passes  between  two  agents 
before  they  separate.  A  careful  examination  of  the  proofs,  however,  reveals  that  this 
assumption  is  not  necessary  for  the  results;  it  mainly  serves  to  simplify  the  notation. LIMIT  THEOREMS  2.5 
to  trade  a  single  unit  of  the  indivisible  commodity,  in  the  aggregate  the 
market  looks  like  one  in  which  a perfectly  divisible  commodity  is traded.  In 
between  these  extremes  one  has  a  situation  like  that  pictured  in  Fig.  1 
below.  The  step  functions  are  demand  and  supply  curves.  Vertical  distances 
represent  the  limit  price  or  reservation  price  of the  marginal  agent  at  that 
point.  Horizontal  distances  represent  the  measure  of agents  with  that  limit 
price  or  reservation  price. 
The  first  result  I  establish  for  this  model  is  a  limit  theorem  for  an 
economy  with  a finite  measure  of agents.  These  agents  are assumed  to  enter 
the  economy  according  to  some  fixed  but  arbitrary  pattern.  Since  their 
measure  is  finite  the  set  of  all  such  agents  constitutes  a  well-defined 
exchange  economy.  This  economy  generically  has  a  unique  Walrasian 
equilibrium  price  and  a  unique  Walras  allocation.  All  agents  are  assumed 
to  discount  future  utilities  at  the  same  rate.  (This  is  a  simplifying 
assumption  which  is not  essential  for  the  central  conclusions  of the  paper.) 
Allowing  the  common  discount  rate  to  converge  to  zero,  we  generate  a 
sequence  of perfect  equilibria  and  their  corresponding  allocations.  A  limit 
point  of  this  sequence  of perfect  equilibrium  allocations  is  shown  to  be  a 
Walras  allocation  of  the  underlying  exchange  economy.  Binmore  and 
Herrero  [2]  have  also  studied  non-steady  state  equilibrium,  using  the  basic 
RW  model.  They  assume  that  two  types  of agents  bargain  over  a unit  sur- 
plus.  All  agents  are  in  the  market  at  the  first  date.  They  show that  in  the 
limit,  as the  discount  rate  converges  to  zero,  all  the  surplus  goes to  the  type 
of  agent  that  is  present  in  smaller  numbers.  Interpreting  the  model  as  a 
market  for  an  indivisible  commodity,  this  is  the  competitive  outcome.  The 
price  is  zero  (resp. one)  if  there  are  more  sellers  than  buyers  (resp.  buyers 
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than  sellers).  Their  analysis  admits  the  case where  two  agents  may  bargain 
over  several  periods.  (In  my  model,  agents  are  re-matched  every  period, 
though  this  does  not  appear  to  be crucial  to  the  central  conclusions).  They 
introduce  the  concept  of security  equilibrium,  which  proves  to  be  a power- 
ful  analytical  tool,  to  deal  with  these  more  difficult  cases. 
The  competitive  result  (Theorem  1,  Sect.  5)  has  two  important 
implications.  First,  it  shows that  the  theorem  “in  the  limit”  obtained  in  [6] 
cannot  be  explained  as the  result  of a discontinuity.  The  limit  of a sequence 
of  perfect  equilibria  as  frictions  converge  to  zero  is  Walrasian.  Second, 
indivisibilities  are  no  obstacle  to  a Walrasian  outcome.  The  model  contains 
the  RW  model  as a special  case. Once  these  two  possible  explanations  are 
ruled  out,  we are  left  with  stationarity  to  account  for  the  RW  paradox.  In 
the  economy  with  a finite  measure  of agents,  stationarity  is never  assumed. 
In  fact,  stationarity  is  generally  impossible,  since  the  flow  of  potential 
entrants  is  quite  arbitrary  but  ultimately  declines  to  zero.  In  the  stationary 
economy,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  assumed  to  be  a  constant  flow  of 
potential  entrants.  Since  a  positive,  constant  measure  of agents  enters  the 
market  at  each  date,  the  set  of  all  agents  has  infinite  measure.  The 
corresponding  exchange  economy  is  not  well  defined.  With  the  infinite 
measure  of  buyers  and  sellers,  demand  and  supply  are  also  infinite.  The 
usual  market-clearing  condition  is meaningless  in  this  context.  Instead,  one 
has to  use some  notion  of market-clearing  on uverage  and  this,  it  turns  out, 
is  the  key  to  the  RW  paradox. 
The  next  step  then  is  to  analyse  the  stationary  economy  in  which  the 
flow  of  potential  entrants  is  constant.  I  focus  on  the  stationary  perfect 
equilibria  of these  models,  that  is,  equilibria  in  which  the  distribution  of 
agents  by  type  at  each  date  is  constant.  This  is  the  exact  analogue  of  the 
case considered  by  RW.  As  before  I  assume  that  all  agents  have  the  same 
discount  factor  and  consider  the  sequence  of  perfect  equilibria 
corresponding  to  a  sequence  of  discount  factors  converging  to  unity.  We 
are  interested  in  characterizing  the  limit  points.  This  characterization 
proceeds  in  two  steps.  The  first  step  is  to  show that  in  the  limit  there  is  a 
uniform  price.  That  is,  every  agent  exchanges  the  commodity  at  the  same 
price,  regardless  of  his  type  and  the  date  and  whether  he  is  proposer  or 
responder.  This  very  strong  result  by  itself  shows that  the  limit  point  is very 
close  to  being  a  Walrasian  equilibrium.  What  remains  to  be  shown  is 
whether  this  price  is  market-clearing.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  uniform 
price  result  holds  in  the  original  RW  model.  Because  there  is only  one  type 
of  buyer  and  one  type  of  seller,  it  is  trivially  true  in  a  stationary 
equilibrium  that  all  agents  trade  at  one  price. 
In  stationary  states,  where  the  measure  of  agents  passing  through  the 
economy  is  infinite,  we  are  forced  to  define  market-clearing  in  some 
average  sense. There  are two  obvious  candidates.  The  first  corresponds  to  a LIMIT  THEOREMS  27 
concept  of  stock  equilibrium.  At  each  date  there  is a constant  distribution  of 
types  of agents  in  the  market.  If  we abstract  this  “stock”  of agents,  we can 
define  a corresponding  market-clearing  condition  in  terms  of their  demands 
and  supplies.  According  to  this  condition,  a  price  is  market-clearing  if  it 
equates  the  demands  and  supplies  of the  buyers  and  sellers  who  are  in  the 
market  at  a given  date.  In  Fig.  1, D  and  S  are  the  demand  and  supply  cur- 
ves constructed  using  the  data  of the  agents  in  the  market  at  a single  date. 
The  market-clearing  price  is p*.  This  is the  concept  of market-clearing  price 
adopted  by  RW  and  others.  The  alternative  notion  of market-clearing  price 
corresponds  to  a  concept  of flow  equilibrium.”  Instead  of focusing  on  the 
stock  of agents  in  the  market  at  a given  date  we look  at  the  flow  of agents 
into  (or  out  of)  the  market  at  that  date.  A  new set of demand  and  supply 
curves  can  be  constructed  using  the  data  of this  set  of agents  and  a  new 
market-clearing  price  defined  by  the  intersection  of the  curves.  In  Fig.  1, 
these  are  given  by  D’  and  S’  and  p**,  respectively. 
In  the  market  interpretation  of the  RW  model,  the  market-clearing  con- 
dition  for  flow  equilibrium  is  automatically  satisfied.  By  assumption  the 
numbers  of  buyers  and  sellers  flowing  into  the  market  at  each  date  are 
equal.  Since  they  want  to  trade  one  unit  each,  market-clearing  in  this  sense 
is  satisfied  at  any  price.  For  this  reason  flow  equilibrium  may  not  seem  a 
very  satisfactory  concept  in  the  simple  case examined  by  RW.  In  the  more 
general  case  represented  by  Fig.  1, however,  flow  equilibrium  makes  a  lot 
of  sense.  With  an  arbitrary,  constant  Row  of  potential  entrants  into  the 
market,  a  stationary  equilibrium  is  possible  only  if  potential  entrants  can 
choose  whether  to  enter  the  market.  The  price  which  obtains  in  the  market 
must  be  such  that  the  numbers  of buyers  and  sellers  choosing  to  enter  are 
equal.  But  this  condition  is  met  only  if  the  observed  price  is  the  flow 
market-clearing  price.  As  Fig.  1  illustrates,  the  flow  market-clearing  con- 
dition  is  both  non-trivial  and  necessary  for  a  stationary  equilibrium.  It 
therefore  seems  the  natural  concept  of market-clearing  to  use. 
There  are  other  considerations  which  argue  for  the  flow concept  as well. 
Although  at  any  date  there  is an  unsatisfied  queue  on  the  long  side  of the 
market,  every  agent  does  eventually  trade.  Furthermore,  the  excess demand 
or  supply,  which  appears  significant  at  a  single  date,  is  constant  and 
therefore  negligible  relative  to  the  trade  carried  out  over  the  entire  history 
of the  economy. 
The  most  convincing  argument  against  the  stock  equilibrium  concept 
comes  from  the  formal  characterization  of  the  limit  point,  however.  If  we 
take  the  stock  approach  first  it  can  be  shown  that  a generalized  version  of 
RW’s  result  will  hold.  For  the  special  case where  agents  have  the  same  dis- 
count  factor,  the  average  surplus  of  agents  on  either  side  of  the  market 
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must  be  the  same  in  the  limit.  In  terms  of  Fig.  1,  the  area  below  the 
demand  curve  D  and  above  the  price  line  p**  is  equal  to  the  area  above 
the  supply  curve  S  and  below  the  price  line  p **.  If discount  factors  differed 
between  buyers  and  sellers,  the  proportions  between  these  areas  would  dif- 
fer accordingly.  Note  that  this  result  applies  to  the  set of agents  actually  in 
the  economy  at  a given  date.  In  general,  there  is no  reason  to  think  that  the 
price  p**  which  satisfies  this  relationship  will  coincide  with  the  stock 
equilibrium  market-clearing  price  p*.  So  even  in  this  general  model  there  is 
a  variant  of the  RW  paradox. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  p **  is  the  market-clearing  price  in  the  flow 
sense. Furthermore  it  is  the  flow  market-clearing  condition  which  deter- 
mines  p**.  Given  an  arbitrary,  constant  flow of potential  entrants  there  will 
generically  be  a  unique  price  which  is  consistent  with  a  stationary 
equilibrium.  Thus,  in  the  limit,  in  the  stationary  case, the  flow of potential 
entrants  uniquely  determines  the  price  p**  and  hence  the  payoffs  of all  the 
agents.  Nothing  of consequence  is determined  by  the  stock  of agents  in  the 
market.  On  the  contrary,  the  stock  is  determined  by  the  generalized  RW 
condition.  In  equilibrium,  the  size of the  queue  of unsatisfied  agents  adjusts 
so  that  the  sum  of expected  payoffs  on  both  sides  of the  market  is  equal. 
The  payoff  of each  individual  agent  is  unaffected  by  this  condition.  This 
seems  to  me  the  strongest  possible  argument  against  the  use  of  the  stock 
equilibrium  concept.  The  stock  demand  and  supply  curves  determine 
nothing  of interest  in  the  generic  case and  are themselves  determined  by  the 
flow of potential  entrants.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  relationship  between 
the  stock  demand  and  supply  curves  and  the  price  is  of  no  interest.  In 
applications,  we may  be  able  to  observe  the  stocks  but  not  the  potential 
flows.  In  that  case the  Rubinstein-Wolinsky  theory  comes  into  its  own. 
2.  THE BARGAINING GAME 
As I  indicated  in  the  Introduction,  the  economic  structure  underlying  the 
bargaining  game  can  be taken  to  represent  a market  in  which  an indivisible 
commodity  is  traded.  On  one  side  of the  market  we  have  sellers,  each  of 
whom  has  a  single  unit  of  the  commodity;  on  the  other  side  we  have 
buyers,  each  of  whom  wants  to  purchase  a  single  unit  of the  commodity. 
Other  interpretations  are,  of course,  possible  and  none  of the  present  inter- 
pretation  is necessary  for  the  formal  analysis  or  its  economic  applications. 
There  is  assumed  to  be  a large  number  (strictly  a continuum)  of agents. 
Agents  are  divided  into  two  classes,  buyers  and  sellers.  These  classes  are 
then  subdivided  into  a  linite  number  of  types  of buyers  indexed  i =  l,...,  I 
and  a finite  number  of types  of sellers  indexed  j  =  l,...,  J.  Where  there  is no 
risk  of  ambiguity,  1  and  J  also  stand  for  the  sets of  types  of  buyers  and LIMIT  THEOREMS  29 
sellers  respectively.  Then  H  =  ZuJ  denotes  the  set  of  all  types  of  agents, 
both  buyers  and  sellers. 
Each  buyer  is  characterized  by  a  limit  price.  The  limit  price  of the  i-th 
type  of  buyer  is  denoted  by  si 3  0  (i =  l,...,  I).  We  can  think  of  si  as  the 
utility  derived  from  one  unit  of the  commodity  by  the  ith  type.  The  buyers’ 
types  are  labelled  so that 
s, >s,>  ...  >S[.  (1) 
Each  seller  is  characterized  by  a reservation  price.  The  reservation  price  of 
the jth  type  of seller  is denoted  by  ti 3  0  (j  =  l,...,  J).  Think  of j  as the  dis- 
utility  of parting  with  one  unit  of the  commodity  for  the,jth  type  of seller. 
The  sellers’  types  are  labelled  so  that 
t,  <t,  <  ...  <  1J.  (2) 
Each  seller  has a single  unit  of the  good  which  he  wants  to  sell;  each  buyer 
wants  to  buy  precisely  one  unit.  If a seller  of thejth  type  and  a buyer  of the 
ith  type  exchange  a single  unit  of  the  commodity  they  create  a  surplus  of 
si -  tj  (which  could  be  negative).  All  agents  are  assumed  to  have  trans- 
ferable  utilities  so  the  surplus  or  gains  from  trade  can  be  divided  in  any 
manner  they  wish. 
An  example  may  help  to  make  the  interpretation  of  these  terms 
absolutely  clear.  Suppose  the  market  is  a  labor  market.  The  buyers  are 
employers;  the  sellers  are  workers.  Each  employer  wants  to  hire  at  most 
one  worker;  each  worker  wants  at  most  one job.  Then  s, is the  productivity 
of any  worker  for  the  ith  type  of employer  and  ti  is  the  disutility  of labor 
(measured  in  the  same  units)  of the jth  type  of worker.  Other  things  being 
equal,  employers  are  indifferent  about  which  type  of worker  they  hire  and 
workers  are  indifferent  about  which  type  of employer  hires  them. 
The  play  of the  game  takes  place  at  an  infinite  sequence  of dates.  For  the 
moment  I  shall  assume  there  is  an  initial  date  0  and  the  set  of  dates  is 
denoted  by  N  =  (0,  1, 2,...}.  Later,  when  it  is  necessary  to  consider 
stationary  states,  it  is convenient  to  assume  there  is no  first  date.  I  leave  the 
reader  to  make  the  appropriate  notational  adjustments  for  the  second  case. 
Each  agent  is  assigned  a single  date  at  which  he  can  enter  the  market.  At 
that  date  he  can  decide  either  to  enter  the  market  or  stay  out.  Because  the 
entry  decision  is endogenous  there  exists  the  possibility  of trivial  equilibria 
in  which  no  trade  takes  place.  If  every  agent  decides  not  to  enter  the 
market,  no  trade  is  possible.  Then  it  is  optimal  for  every  agent  to  remain 
outside  the  market.  A  similar  problem  arises  if exit  is  endogenous.  If  every 
agent  decides  to  leave  the  market,  then  it  is  optimal  for  every  agent  to  do 
so.  The  exit  problem  can  be  resolved,  in  this  model,  simply  by  assuming 
that,  once  in  the  market,  agents  have  to  remain  in  the  market  until  they 
trade.  The  entry  problem  is more  intractable.  We  do  not  want  agents  who 
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high)  to  enter  the  market.  The  reason  is that  these  agents  will  accumulate 
and  eventually  clog  the  matching  process.  Since  we  cannot  prejudge  the 
market’s  decision  about  who  can  and  who  cannot  trade,  the  entry  decision 
must  remain  endogenous.  So  we  are  stuck  with  the  possibility  of  trivial 
equilibria.  However,  these  equilibria  are  not  “stable.”  If  a small  measure  of 
agents  were  accidentally  forced  into  the  market,  the  rest  would  want  to 
follow,  attracted  by  the  gains  from  trade. 
If  an  agent  enters,  he  must  pay  a  fixed,  non-recoverable  entry  fee  e 2  0. 
The  entry  fee, which  is always  assumed  to  be “small,”  is  used to  ensure  that 
agents  who  cannot  trade  do  not  enter  the  market.  (cf.  Proposition  6  in 
Sect. 5.) The  entry  fee is  used  to  avoid  the  problem  of non-trading  entrants. 
(See  above.)  The  fee should  be  thought  of as “small.”  To  obtain  the  correct 
equilibrium  without  a  fee we first  set  e >  0  and  then  take  limits  as  e +  0. 
Once  in  the  market  an  agent  can  remain,  searching  and  bargaining,  as long 
as he  likes.  Once  he  has  completed  a  transaction  he  has  to  leave  and  can- 
not  reenter.  Before  entry  and  after  exit  an  agent  takes  no  part  in  the  game. 
All  agents  discount  future  utilities  at  the  same  constant  rate.  Discounting 
begins  at  the  date  when  the  agent  enters  the  market.  For  example,  an  agent 
who  enters  the  market  at  date  n  and  completes  a transaction  at  date  N  2  n, 
receiving  a  share  z of the  surplus,  has  a  utility  CX?~.  z -  e, where  GI is the 
discount  factor.  It  is  naturally  assumed  that 
O<a<l.  (3) 
The  potential  entrants  at  any  date  are  described  by  the  distribution  of their 
types.  Formally,  let  P(H)  denote  the  power  set of H  and  let  v be a function 
defined  on  P(H)  x N  to  [w  + .  For  any  set  H’  c  H  and  any  date  n E N, 
v( H’,  n)  is the  measure  of potential  entrants  at  n whose  types  belong  to  H’. 
The  function  v is  part  of  the  structure  of  the  model.  It  is  important  to 
remember,  however,  that  v only  describes  potential  entrants  at  each  date.  It 
is  up  to  those  agents  themselves  to  decide  whether  it  is  worth  paying  the 
entry  fee e to  enter  the  market. 
The  structure  of the  model  is defined  by  the  lists  of types  I  and  J  and  the 
numbers  {.s~}~~, and  {  tj},EJ,  by  the  set  of dates  N,  the  discount  factor  a, 
and  by  the  distribution  of  potential  entrants  v.  The  structure 
(z3 J3 Isi},  {lj},  N,  a, v)  satisfying  (1)  to  (3)  is denoted  by  9.  The  bargain- 
ing  game  is  defined  by  Y  together  with  the  specification  of  the  matching 
process  and  the  bargaining  rules.  The  matching  process  adopted  in  this 
paper  is  a  simple  one.  It  should  be  clear  from  the  proofs  that  it  is  not 
necessary  to  restrict  the  analysis  to  this  particular  process.*  But  there  is  a 
5 Although  the  analysis  has  not  been  carried  out  for  more  general  cases  it  seems  likely  that 
what  is  required  is  some  kind  of  connectedness  property.  That  is,  each  type  of  buyer  must 
have  a  positive  probability  of  meeting  every  type  of  seller  that  is  in  the  market  in  significant 
numbers  and  vice  versa.  Of  course,  for  the  analysis  of  steady-states  one  will  have  to  assume 
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considerable  gain  in  the  exposition  from  choosing  such  a  simple  and  trans- 
parent  rule  and  this,  I  think,  outweighs  the  apparent  lack  of generality.  The 
active  agents  at  any  date  n are  those  who  have  already  entered  the  market 
and  have  not  yet  left  it,  together  with  the  current  entrants.  For  any  set 
H’  c  H  and  any  date  n E N,  p(H’,  n)  is  the  measure  of  active  agents  with 
types  in  H’  at  date  n.  The  function  ,U  defined  on  P(H)  x  N  to  R +  is 
endogenously  determined  as part  of the  perfect  equilibrium  of the  bargain- 
ing  game.  It  describes  completely  the  population  of agents  in  the  market  at 
each  date.  The  matching  process  is a function  of p.  Agents  are  assumed  to 
be randomly  matched  in  the  sense that  the  probability  of meeting  an  agent 
of a  given  type  is  equal  to  the  proportion  of that  type  in  the  population. 
The  matching  probabilities  are  given  by  a function  p  defined  on  P(H)  x  N 
to  [0,  11,  where  for  every  H’  c  H  and  n E N, 
p(H’,  n) =  AH’,  ~~)l/dH,  n).  (4) 
The  matching  process  is  serially  independent  in  the  sense that  an  agent’s 
probability  of meeting  an  agent  of a given  type  is independent  of what  has 
happened  at  previous  dates.  When  two  agents  meet,  each  has  an  equal 
probability  of  being  chosen  as a  proposer,  independently  of the  matching 
process. 
At  any  date  n  an  active  agent  acquires  the  following  information: 
(i)  he  observes  whether  he  has been  matched  with  another  agent.  If 
he  has  been  matched,  he  observes  his  own  type,  his  partner’s  type  and 
which  of them  has  been  chosen  as proposer; 
(ii)  next  he  observes  the  proposer’s  move,  which  is  a  demand  for  a 
share  z of the  surplus  generated  by  trade; 
(iii)  finally  the  responder’s  move  is  observed  (the  responder  accepts 
or  rejects  the  proposal). 
The  assumption  that  an  agent  knows  his  opponent’s  reservation  price  or 
limit  price  is restrictive.  Without  this  assumption  we would  have  to  analyze 
a bargaining  game  with  incomplete  information.  The  reason  for  making  the 
assumption  of  complete  information  is  the  following.  In  the  limit,  when 
there  is no  discounting,  there  is no  scope for  inferring  an  agent’s  type  from 
his  willingness  to  delay.  The  only  effect of assuming  incomplete  information 
is  to  force  an  agent  to  treat  all  other  agents  symmetrically.  For  example,  in 
[7]  it  is  strictly  easier  to  show  the  bargaining  equilibrium  is  Walrasian 
under  incomplete  information  than  under  complete  information.  So 
although  here  we are  dealing  with  a limit  theorem  rather  than  a theorem  in 
the  limit,  it  seems that  complete  information  is the  more  interesting  case to 
study. 
An  agent’s  information  at  a  node  which  he  controls  consists  of 
everything  observed  at  previous  dates  since  entry,  together  with  what  he 
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has  observed  at  previous  nodes  at  the  current  date.  In  other  words,  this  is a 
game  of perfect  recall.  A strategy  for  an  agent  is a function  which  prescribes 
a  feasible  action  at  each  node  he  controls.  The  game  is  analysed  as a  sub- 
game  perfect  Nash  equilibrium.  Each  agent’s  strategy  is  a  best  response  to 
the  strategy  of other  agents  at  every  possible  node  of the  game  and  not  just 
the  nodes  observed  during  the  play  of the  game. 
3.  RECURSIVE  EQUATIONS  OF  THE  BARGAINING  GAME 
A  precise  definition  of the  bargaining  game  requires  a rather  weighty  for- 
malism  which  I  have  here  sought  to  avoid.  The  analysis  of the  game,  on  the 
other  hand,  can  often  be  restricted  to  “soft”  or  informal  arguments.  The 
most  important  tool  in  achieving  this  simplification  is  the  value function 
which  expresses  the  expected  utility  of the  game  to  an  agent  as a function 
of his  type  and  the  current  date.  The  value  function  satisfies  certain  recur- 
sive  equations  which  bear  a  strong  family  resemblance  to  the  functional 
equations  of dynamic  programing.  These  equations  can  be  used  to  charac- 
terize  the  perfect  equilibrium  without  any  direct  reference  to  the  potentially 
complex  strategies  themselves. 
The  generic  symbol  for  a  value  function  is  u.  The  value  function  is 
defined  on  HxN  to  [w,.  In  this  section,  I  consider  a  fixed  perfect 
equilibrium  of a game  with  discount  factor  a <  1. To  emphasize  the  depen- 
dence  on  CI, the  value  function  is  denoted  by  u,  and  the  distribution  of 
active  agents  by  11%.  For  any  (h, n) E Hx  N,  u,(h,  n)  is  the  expected  utility 
of  an  agent  of  type  h  at  the  beginning  of  date  n  (i.e.,  before  meeting  his 
bargaining  partner  for  that  date).  Implicit  in  the  definition  of  the  value 
function  is the  fact that  an  agent’s  expected  utility  is independent  of his  per- 
sonal  history.  This  fact  follows  from  the  assumption  that  his  history  is  not 
known  to  his  opponent  and  that  the  matching  process  treats  all  agents 
symmetrically.  An  agent’s  expected  utility  is exclusive  of the  entry  fee e and 
is discounted  to  the  initial  date  0. To  obtain  the  expected  utility  of an  agent 
who  enters  the  market  at  some  later  date  N  >  0, simply  multiply  u,(h, n) by 
cN. 
The  functions  u,  and  pL, contain  all  the  information  we need  about  the 
perfect  equilibrium.  It  should  be  clear  that  if a  perfect  equilibrium  exists, 
the  corresponding  functions  u,  and  ccl are  unique  and  well  defined.  Recall 
that  u,  and  pL, are  non-stochastic  because  there  is no  aggregate  uncertainty. 
Corresponding  to  (u,,  pL,) we have  the  matching  probabilities  pa defined  by 
equation  (2.4).6  The  following  proposition  establishes  the  basic  recursive 
equation  relating  v,  and  p,. 
6 In  each  section  equations  are  numbered  1,  2,....  References  to  equations  in  another  section 
are  preceded  by  a  section  number  and  a  decimal  point.  Thus  equation  (4)  in  Section  2  is 
referred  to  as  (2.4). PROPOSITION  1.  For  any  (i, n) E I x  N, 
u,(i,n)=  u,(i,n+l)+tCp,(j,n) 
iEJ 
11,  u,(i  n+  1)) 
\  jEJ  / 
x max{  S(.9, -  tl)  -  u,(j,  n + 
and similarly,  for  any  (j,  n) E J x  N, 
u,(j,n)=  1-t 
( 
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(1) 
x max(cc”(.s-  ti)-u,(i,  n+  l),  u,(j,  n+  l)}.  (2) 
Proof  Omitted. 
The  intuition  behind  the  proposition  is the  following.  At  any  date  n,  one 
of several  things  may  happen  to  an  agent  of the  ith  type.  He  may  not  trade, 
in  which  case he  has  to  wait  until  the  next  date  and  his  expected  utility  is 
u,(i,  n +  1).  Or  he  may  receive  an  offer  which  he  accepts.  In  that  case also 
his  expected  utility  is  u,(i,  n +  1).  In  a  perfect  equilibrium  he  must  accept 
any  offer  which  is better  than  uJi,  n +  1) (his  effective  security  level)  so the 
proposer  can  reduce  his  payoff  to  precisely  u,(i,  n +  1).  Finally,  the  agent 
may  make  a proposal  which  is accepted  by  an  agent  of some  typej.  In  that 
case,  by  the  preceding  argument,  he  receives  the  total  surplus  CC”(S~-  t,) 
minus  what  is  required  to  gain  the  responder’s  acceptance,  namely 
u,(j,  n +  1).  His  expected  utility  at  the  beginning  of date  n  is  simply  the 
average  of  his  expected  utilities  in  each  of  these  events,  weighted  by  the 
probabilities  of each  event.  This  is  precisely  what  Proposition  1 says. 
For  the  next  proposition  some  additional  notation  is  required.  For  any 
function  .f from  I  to  R  let 
Aif  =f(i)  -f(i+  1).  (3) 
Thus,  for  example, 
Ais;=si-si+l  (4) 
for  i =  l,...,  I-  1. The  same  convention  applies  to  functions  defined  on  J,  of 
course. 
PROPOSITION  2.  For  any  (i, n) EZX  N  if  i<  I-  1 then A,o,(i,  n) < c? Ais, 
andfor  any  (j,n)~JxN  ifj<J-1  then A,u,(j,n)<  --a”A,ti. 
Proof:  From  Eq.  (1 ), 
J’J  >  jsJ 
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For  any  numbers  a,  6, c, d, 
max{a,b)-maxjc,d}<max{a-c,b-d). 
Then,  for  any j  E J, 
A, max  { a%,  -  t,) -  u,(j,  n +  1 ), u,( i, n +  1)) 
~maxjAi(~n(~,-rti)-u,(j,n+I)),Ai~,(i,n+l)f 
=max{&  Ap,,  A,u,(i,  n+  1)). 
Substitution  in  Eq.  (5)  gives 
Ai~,(i  n) d 
( 
1 -  4 C  p,(j,  n) 
> 
AiU,(i,  n +  1) +  $ C  p,..j,  B) 
jEJ  jE.l 
xmax(cr”  Api,  A,u,(i,  n+  1)).  (6) 
NOW  suppose,  contrary  to  what  we want  to  prove,  that  A,o,(i,  n) > a” A,s,. 
Inequality  (6)  implies  that  A,v,(i,  n +  1) >  A,u,(i,  n).  Otherwise  the 
inequality  could  only  be  satisfied  if  A,o,(i,  n +  1) < anA,si,  in  which  case, 
since  0 <  i  ~,,,p&,  n) f  1, the  inequality  would  imply  A,u,(i,  n) < a” Ap,, 
a  contradiction.  Because  (6)  holds  for  all  n,  it  follows  by  induction  on  n 
that  v9(i, n +  k)  >, u,(i,  n +  k  -  1)  for  all  k  >  1. Then 
lim  A,v,(i,n+k)3a”A,s,>O. 
k -  r‘z 
However,  the  fact  that  u,(h,  n) >, 0  for  all  (h, tr) E H  x N  and  the  surplus  to 
be  divided  converges  to  zero  as  n -+  cc  when  a <  1  implies  that 
lim  k-a  u*(i,  n +  k)  =  0,  a  contradiction.  Thus,  A,u,(i,  n) d an A+,.  The 
proof  that  Aju,(j,  n) <  -a”  A,t,  is similar.  1 
Proposition  2 shows that  an  agent  cannot  obtain  more  from  the  bargain- 
ing  game  than  he  contributes.  In  a competitive  equilibrium  he  gets  exactly 
what  he  contributes.  When  a <  1,  on  the  other  hand,  he  may  get  less 
because  he  happens  to  be  the  responder  and  can  do  no  better  than  if 
agreement  had  not  been  reached. 
4.  LIMIT  POINTS  OF  PERFECT  EQUILIBRIA 
All  the  information  we need  about  a  perfect  equilibrium  is  contained  in 
the  value  function  u  and  the  distribution  p.  Let  A =  (a,,  a,,...}  be  a 
sequence  of numbers  in  (0,  1)  converging  to  1. For  any  a E A,  let  (u,,  ccl) 
denote  the  values  of  z~  and  p  corresponding  to  some  perfect  equilibrium  of 
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WY PAL.4  has  a  pointwise  convergent  subsequence  which  can  be  taken 
to  be  the  original  sequence.  Let 
Note  that  (u, p)  is  not  necessarily  an  equilibrium  of  the  game  with  CI =  1; 
(u, p)  simply  represents  the  limiting  behavior  of a  sequence  of equilibria  as 
frictions  vanish.  For  any  H’  c  H  and  n E N  define 
p(H’,  n) =  AH’,  n)/AK  n).  (2) 
From  (2.4)  and  the  convergence  of  {fix}  it  follows  that  p,(H’,  n)  -tp(H’,  )I) 
asa+l  foranyH’cHandnEFV. 
With  these definitions  one  can  immediately  state  analogues  “in  the  limit” 
of the  results  derived  in  Section  3.  In  each  case the  result  follows  from  the 
continuity  of the  relationship  and  the  convergence  of  {(Us,  p,)},,,,,.  From 
Proposition  1 we have,  for  any  (i,  n) E 1x  N, 
u(i,n)= 
( 
l-+&r(j,n)  u(i,n+l)++Cp(j,n) 
1e.J  1  it.l 
x max{si--  tj-  u(j,  n +  l),  u(i  r2  +  1))  (3) 
and  for  any  (j,  n) E J  x fV, 
u(j,n)= 
( 
l-;Cp(i,n)  r~(j,n+l)+)Cp(i,n) 
iE/  >  iEl 
xmax(s;-t,-r(i,n+l),u(j,n+l)].  (4) 
It  is  immediate  from  (3)  and  (4)  that  u(h, n) 3  u(h +  1, n) 20  for  any 
(h, n)~  Hx  N.  Let  u(h,  co)  denote  the  limit  as  n -+  CC of  u(h, n)  for  any 
hEH. 
PROPOSITION  3.  Fur  any  (i  j)  E Ix  J  if  either  lim,,  supp(i,  n) >  0  or 
lim,  supp(j,  n) >O  then (s;-  tj) d  o(i, co) +  u(j,  a). 
Proof:  Suppose  that  lim,  supp(i,,  n) >  0  and  let  p(  ., co)  denote  a  limit 
point  of  {pt.,  n)jntN  such  that  p(i,,  co) >  0.  From  (4)  and  continuity, 
4.L  a)=  1 -t  C  p(j, co) 
( 
4.L  a)+$  2  p(j, 00) 
iE,  >  icl 
xmax{si-  tl-u(j,  a),  u(i, co)}, 
which  implies  that 
O=  CP(i,  a3)max{s,-r,-u(i,  co)-u(j,  c0),0}. 
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Since  p(i,,  co) >  0,  si,, -  tj -  u(i,,  00) -  u(j,  co) <  0  as  required.  The  other 
case is handled  similarly.  1 
COROLLARY.  For  any  h E H  if  lim,  supp(h,  n) >  0  then  u(h, n) = 
u(h,n+l)for  any  nEN. 
ProoJ:  Suppose  that  lim,  sup p(i,  n) >  0  for  some  i E I.  Then  from 
Proposition  3,  si -  fj 6  v(i  co) +  u(j,  co)  for  any  j  E J.  Since  u(h, n)  is 
monotonically  non-increasing  in  n for  any  h E H,  s, -  fj <  u( i,  n)  +  u(j,  n)  for 
any  n E N  and  for  any  j  E .Z.  From  inspection  of  (3)  it  appears  that 
v(i,  n) =  u(i,  n +  1)  for  all  n E N.  The  other  case is  similar.  1 
From  Proposition  2 we have,  for  any  (i,  n) E Z x N, 
A;u(i,  n) <  ArSi  (5) 
and  for  any  (j,  n)~Jx  N, 
A,u(j,  n)  <  -Ajfj.  (6) 
In  competitive  equilibrium  these  inequalities  hold  as  strict  equalities  for 
agents  who  trade.  As a  first  step  toward  establishing  this  result,  I  derive  a 
lower  bound  for  A,u(h,  n)  in  the  next  two  propositions.  First,  some  more 
notation  is needed.  For  any  (i,  j,  n) E Ix  .Z  x N  define 
if  si-ti~u(i,n+l)+~(j,n+l) 
otherwise 
and 
if  si-ti>u(i,n+l)+u(j,n+l) 
otherwise. 
For  any  (i,n)EZxN  define 
1-t 1 ti(j,.Lk) 
jcJ  > 
and  for  any  (j,  n) E J  x N  define 
For  any  (i, j,  n) E Z x J  x N,  $(i,  j,  n)  is the  probability  that  an  agent  of type 
i,  who  is  in  the  market  at  date  n,  meets  an  agent  of type  j  and  can  trade 
with  him.  The  interpretation  of $(j,  i, n)  is  similar.  For  any  (i,  n)  E Ix  N, 
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date  0,  will  not  propose  to  anyone  with  whom  he  can  trade  before  date  n. 
The  interpretation  of 4(j,  n)  is similar. 
PROPOSITION  4.  For  any  (i,  n ) E Ix  N, 
u(i,  n) =  $(i,  n)-’  f  i(i,  k)  i  C  $(i,  j,  k)(s,  -  t, -  u(j,  k  +  1)) 
k=n  jeJ 
+qS(i,n)p’q4(i,N+1)o(i,N+1) 
and,  similarly,  for  any  (j,  n) E J  x N, 
u(j,n)=4(j,n)-’  f  &j,k)tC  ~(j,i,k)(si-rj-U(i,k+l)) 
k=n  it1 
+~(j,n)-‘d(j,N+l)u(j,N+l). 
Proof  The  proof  is  by  induction  on  N.  For  any  (i,  n) E 1 x N,  the 
expansion  for  o(i,  n)  is identical  with  Eq.  (3)  when  N  =  n. Now  suppose  it  is 
valid  for  some  N  3  n.  Then 
o(i,n)=q5(i,n)-’  f  #(i,k)$  1  $(i,j,k)(.s-t,-u(i,k+l)) 
k=n  jeJ 
+d(i,  n)-’  q&i, N+  1) u(i,  N+  1) 
=4(i,n)d’kz  d(i,k)$  c  ~(i,j,k)(si-tj-o(i,k+l)) 
n  JEJ 
+#(i,n)-‘@(i,N+l)  +  1  +(i,j,N+l)(s;--t,-u(j,N+2)) 
i  JEJ 
+(1-f~J~(ii,N+l))a(r,N+2)i 
N+l 
=O(i,  n)-’  ,C,  4th  k)t  C  @(hi  k)(si-tj-u(i,  k+  1)) 
jsJ 
+4(&n)-‘$(i,N+2)u(i,N+2). 
The  expansion  for  u(i,  n)  is thus  valid  for  all  N  3  n. The  proof  for  u(j,  n)  is 
similar.  1 
PROPOSITION  5.  For  any  i =  l,...,  I  -  1 and  n E N, 
d+(i,  n)34(i+  1, n))’  f  +(i+  1, k)  $ c  t,b(i, j,  k)  dp, 
k=n  jsJ 
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Similarly,  for  any j  =  I ,..., J-  1 and  n E k4, 
AjUG,  n)>,b(j+  1, n)-’  f  4(j+  1, k)i  1  $(i,  j,  k)(  -A,t,) 
k=n  /EJ 
+d(j+l,n)-‘&j+l,N+l)A,u(j,N+l). 
Proof:  Once  again  the  proof  is  by  induction  and  I  only  prove  the  first 
inequality.  The  inequality  is  an  identity  for  any  i =  l,...,  I-  1,  n E N  and 
N  =  n -  1. Suppose  it  is  true  for  some  N  >  n -  1. Then 
AiU(i,  n)Z&i+  1, n))’  $J  &i+  1, k)  4 C  $(i,  j,  k)  A,s, 
k=n  jEJ 
+$(i+l,n))‘d(i+l,  N+  l)A,u(i,  N+  1) 
=4(&n)-’  i  &i+  l,k)$C  i&i,  j,k)A,s, 




1 -f  1  $(i,j,  N+  1)  u(i,  N+2) 
JEJ  1 
+j  c  $(i,  j,  N+  l)(.r-t,-u(j,  N+2))  (7) 
jkJ 
Ai  l-4  c  $(i,  j,  N+  1)  o(i,  N+2) 
jEJ 
+$  1  $(i,j,  N+  l)(Si-tj-U(j,  N+  1)) 
jeJ 
1 --t  1  Ic/(i+  l,j,  N+  1) 
jcJ 
-&,~JAi$(i,j,N+l)u(i,N+2)+f~  +(i+l,j,N+l)A,s, 
jsJ 
+$  1  A,$(&  j,  N+  l)(s;-lj-V(j,  N-l-  1)).  (8) 
From  (5)  and  the  definition  of  rl/  it  follows  that  A,$(&  j,  N+  1) 2  0  and 
thatdj~(i,j,N+1)>Oimpliessi-ti-o(i,N+l)-~(j,N+l)~O.Thus, 
fjgJAiljl(i,  j,  N+  l)(si-t;-v(i,  N+  1)-~(j,  N+  l))>O LIMIT  THEOREMS 




1-1  c  $(i,j,N+l)  u(i,N+2) 
jtJ 
+&C  ~(i,j,N+l)(s,-t,-v(j,N+l)) 
jcJ 
++  1  $(i+l,j,N+l)d;s,. 
Substituting  this  inequality  into  (7)  produces  the  desired  result  for  N+  1 
and,  by  induction,  for  all  N+  1.  1 
5.  ECONOMIES  WITH  FINITE  MEASURE 
In  this  section  the  results  obtained  in  Sections  3 and  4 are  applied  to  the 
case of an  economy  in  which  the  total  measure  of all  potential  entrants  is 
finite.  This  case is important  for  several  reasons.  First,  with  a finite  measure 
of  agents  the  economy  has  a  well-defined  set  of competitive  equilibria.  In 
the  limit,  as a -+  1, the  perfect  equilibria  of the  bargaining  game  implement 
one  of these  equilibria.  When  the  measure  of agents  is infinite  there  is some 
ambiguity  about  the  definition  of competitive  equilibrium  and  the  available 
limit  theorems  are  therefore  harder  to  interpret.  Second,  the  finite  measure 
case is a  particularly  tractable  example  in  which  the  proportions  of agents 
of different  types  change  over  time  as a  result  of trade.  These  endogenous 
changes  in  the  distribution  of  agents  are  an  important  factor  in  ensuring 
the  competitive  outcome.  Third,  the  assumption  of  a  finite  measure  of 
agents  was used  in  [7]  to  obtain  a theorem  “in  the  limit”  for  a bargaining 
game  based  on  a  very  general  exchange  economy.  The  “limit  theorem” 
obtained  in  this  section  can  be  seen  as  complementary  to  the  result 
obtained  in  [7],  at  least  for  this  very  special  class  of games.  It  shows that 
the  limit  economy  studied  in  [7]  is  a  good  approximation  to  economies 
with  small  but  positive  discount  rates  and  a  finite  measure  of  agents.  Of 
course,  one  could  also  prove  a  theorem  “in  the  limit”  for  the  economy 
described  in  Section  4,  i.e.,  prove  that  Theorem  1 is  true  for  a =  1. 
The  crucial  assumption  used  in  this  section  is  that 
v(H,  n) =  0  for  n =  1, 2,....  (1) 
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c  n  c N v(H,  n) <  co.  That  case  corresponds  more  exactly  to  the  entry 
assumptions  made  in  [6]  but  otherwise  does  not  add  extra  insight.  The 
more  limited  assumption  (1)  is  made  to  simplify  the  analysis.)  From  the 
definition  of  pI  it  is  clear  that  for  any  H’  c  H  and  no  N,  pZ(H’,  n)> 
pX( H’,  IZ +  1). Taking  limits  as IX -+  1 gives 
p(H’,  n) >  p(H’,  n +  1)  (2) 
for  any  H’ c  H  and  n E N.  It  follows  immediately  that,  for  any  H’  t  H, 
lim  p(HI,  n) =  p(HI,  co)  (3)  neN 
exists.  Equation  (3)  immediately  implies  via  (4.4)  that  for  any  H’  c  H, 
lim  p(H’,  n) =p(H’,  co) 
ncrm 
exists. 
The  value  of p( .,  co ) has important  implications  for  the  value  function  u, 
as we saw in  Section  4.  The  sequence  of propositions  below  considers  dif- 
ferent  possibilities  concerning  p( ., cc ) and  p( . , co)  in  order  to  characterize 
0 completely. 
PROPOSITION  6.  Suppose that  e > 0 and the economy has  finite  measure. 
For  any  h E H  such that  p(h, co) > 0, &h,  n) +  0 as n +  co. 
Proof  The  sum  of  the  expected  utilities  of  the  active  agents  in  the 
market  at  any  date  cannot  exceed  the  total  surplus  that  could  be produced 
if those  agents  were immediately  matched  in  an  optimal  way. Thus,  for  any 
tx and  n E N  there  must  exist  numbers  x,(i,  j,  n) 2 0 for  every  (i, j)  E Ix  J 
such  that 
,& dh, n)  u,(h,  n)  < C c x,(6  j, n)(si-  tj) 
iefjtJ 
and  such  that 
and 
z,  x,(6  j,  n) d p&j,  n)  for  each  Jo J. LIMIT  THEOREMS  41 
Taking  limits,  first  as CI -+  1 and  then  as n +  co,  we see that  there  must  exist 
a  number  x(i,  j)  >  0 for  every  (i, j)  E Ix  .Z such  that 
where 
1  X(i,j)GP(i,  a)  for each  i E I 
jsJ 
and 
iF,x(i..i)G&,  co)  foreach  ZEJ. 
From  (3)  it  follows  that  p(Z,  co) >O  if  and  only  if  ~(5,  ‘;o) >O.  To  see 
this  suppose  that  p(Z, co) >  0 and  p(J,  co) =  0.  (The  case where  p(.Z, co) >  0 
and  p(i,  co) =  0 is exactly  similar.)  Then  (3)  implies  that  u(i,  co) =  0 for  any 
in  I  such  that  ~(i,  co) >  0 and,  by  the  corollary  to  Proposition  3, o(i, n) = 0 
for  all  n E N.  But  this  means  that  for  all  CI sufficiently  large  u,(i,  0) <  e. No 
agent  of type  i will  enter  the  market,  ,u,(i, n) =  0  for  all  n E N  and  tx suf- 
ficiently  large  and  so ~(i,  n) =  0 for  all  n E fV, a contradiction. 
From  Proposition  3, if ~(i,  GO)  >  0 or  ,~(j,  co) >  0 then  S, -  t, -  z~(i, co) - 
u(j,  co ) 6  0.  But  this  together  with  (3)  implies  that  for  any  (i, j)  E Ix  J,  if 
~(i,  co)>0  and  ~(j,  co)>0  then  si-  tj-u(i,  KI)-u(j,  co)=O.  By  the 
corollary  to  Proposition  3, for  any  n E N,  s, -  t, -  U( i, n) -  v(j,  H) =  0. Then, 
for  any  i E I  such  that  p(i,  co) > 0, 
limsup  C  +(i,j,n)>O, 
n  jsJ 
which  implies  that  lim,!,  oc #(i,  n) =  0.  The  analogous  result  obviously 
holds  for  any j  E .Z such  that  ,~(j,  co) >  0.  1 
PROPOSITION  7.  For  any  h E H,  p(h, n) > 0 and p(h,  ccl) = 0 implies that 
c$(h,  00  ) = 0. 
Proof  For  any  a E A  and  HE  N,  the  probability  that  an  agent  of type 
iE Z, who  is  active  at  date  n,  leaves  the  market  at  date  n  is  less  than  or 
equal  to  cjE  J $,(i,  j,  n),  the  probability  of meeting  an  agent  with  whom 
trade  is  possible.  Then 
k(i,  n +  1) 2  1 -  1  +,(i,  j,  n)  pJi  n) 
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since  the  right-hand  side  is a lower  bound  for  the  measure  of agents  of type 
i  remaining  in  the  market  from  date  n to  date  n +  1. 
Taking  limits  as LX  +  1, 
/4i,n+1)3 1-c  @(i,j,n)  (  p(i,n), 
IEJ  ) 
and,  immediately, 
n-l 
A&n)2  n  1-C $(i,j,k)  (  AhO).  (4) 
k=O  jcJ 
Suppose  that  for  some  i E Z, p(i,  0) >  0  and  p(i,  co ) =  0.  (The  general  case 
~(i,  n) >  0  is  treated  in  the  same  way.)  Then  from  (4)  it  follows  that 
fio(l - 1 a(m)=o. 
jfJ 
(5) 
For  every  value  of  k,  cjEJ  i&i,  j,  k))  <  1.  This  is  certainly  true  for  k  =  0 
since  p(i,  0) >  0 by  hypothesis.  If  we assume  that  CjtJ  +(i,  j,  k)  <  1 for  k  = 
O,..., n -  1 then  (4)  implies  ~(i,  n) >  0  so CjE  J $(i,  j,  n) <  1. Thus,  the  claim 
follows  by  induction.  Given  that  the  terms  in  the  product  in  (5)  are  all 
positive,  a necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  (5)  is  that 
f  c  $(i,  j,k)=oo 
k=OJEJ 
in  which  case it  follows  by  the  same  criterion  that 
as required.  The  proof  for j  E J  is exactly  similar.  1 
Propositions  6 and  7 show that  for  any  agent  who  is active  in  the  market 
at  some  date,  &h,  n)  -+ 0 as n +  co. From  Proposition  5 it  follows  that  for 
any  i E I  such  that  i +  1 enters  the  market, 
A,zI(~, n) B  d(i+  1, n))’  2  qS(i+  1, k)  4 C  Il/(i,  j,  k)  AiSi  (6) 
k=n  jeJ 
and  similarly,  for  any j  E J  such  that  j  +  1 enters  the  market, 
djfJ(.i,  n) 3&j+  1, n)-’  f  d(j+  1, k)  t  1  $(j,  i, k)(  -djtj). 
k=n  is, 
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From  the  definition  of 4  however  it  follows  by  direct  calculation  that  for 
any  in  I  such  that  i +  1 enters  the  market, 
B(i,n)F1k~nd(i,k)+~  $(i,j,k)=l-d(i,oo)=l, 
itzf 
and  similarly  for Jo  J,  if j  +  1 enters  the  market.  Hence,  for  any  i E I  such 
that  i+  1 enters 
A,u(i,  n) 2  Ap,  (8) 
and  for  any j  E J  such  that  j  +  1 enters 
A,u(j,  n)>  -  A,t,.  (9) 
The  inequalities  (8)  and  (9)  taken  in  conjunction  with  (4.5)  and  (4.6)  imply 
that  for  any  i E I  (resp. Jo  J)  such  that  i +  1 (resp. j  +  1)  is  in  the  market, 
A,u(i,  n) =  Aisi  (resp.  Aiu(j,  n)=  -A,tj). 
PROPOSITION  8.  If  e >  0 and  the  economy  has finite  measure  there  exists 
UI 2  0 such  that,  for  anJ> i E I  sat$ving  p(i,  n) >  0 for  some  n E N, 
u(i,n)=si-o  for  all  nEN, 
and, for  any j  E J  satisxving  p(j,  n) >  0 ,for  some  n E N, 
u(j,  n) =  0  -  ti  for  all  n E N. 
ProojI  Let  i,  be  the  largest  index  iE  I  satisfying  p(i,  n) >  0  for  some 
n E N.  Define  j,  similarly.  I  claim  that,  for  any  n E N, 
u(k,  n) +  u(h  n) =  3,” -  t,,. 
To  see this,  suppose  first  that,  for  some  nE  N, 
u(k, n) + u(h  n) > s,o- t,,. 
Then  for  any  i <  i,  and  j  d j,,, 
u(i,rz)+u(j,n)>s;-tj  (10) 
since  A,u(i,  n) =  Aisi  for  i<  i,  and  Aju(j,  n)=  -Ajtj  for  j<  j,.  But  since 
A,u(i,  n)<  A,si  and  Aiu(j,  n) <  -Aitj  for  all  iel  and  jE  J  it  follows  that 
(10)  holds  for  all  iE  I  and  je  J.  Consequently,  no  trade  is  possible.  From 
the  fundamental  recursive  equations  (4.3)  and  (4.4)  it  is  clear  that  (10) 
holds  for  all  n’ B  n.  But  this  implies  that  u(i,,  n) =  0 and  u(jO,  n) =  0,  con- 
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Now  consider  the  other  case, where 
u(i,,  n) +  u(j,,  n) <  sio-  tjo. 
Then,  for  any  i <  i,,  and  j  <  j,, 
u(i,  n) +  u(j,  n) <  si -  t,.  (11) 
Then  for  any  triple  (i, j,  k)  E Ix  J  x RJ we know  that  si -  tj -  u(i,  k  +  1)  is 
independent  ofj,  for  any  (i, j,  k)  such  that  II/( i, j,  k)  >  0, and  non-increasing 
in  k.  Then  Proposition  4  indicates  that  u(i,  n)  is non-decreasing  over  time, 
contradicting  ( 11)  and  (4.3 ). 
The  proposition  follows  directly  from  u(i,,  n) +  u(jO,  n) =  si, -  tj,,  and 
d,u(i,  n)=d,s,  for  i<i,  and  dju(j,  n)=  -Ajtj  forj<j,.  1 
To  complete  the  characterization  of  perfect  equilibrium  it  remains  to 
show that  o  is a market-clearing  price.  A  potential  entrant  of type  h at  date 
n  will  enter  if  u(h, n) >  e  and  stay  out  if  u(h, n)  <  e.  He  is  indifferent  if 
u(h, n) =  e. Demand  and  supply  are  equal  at  the  distribution  v if and  only  if 
the  following  conditions  are  satisfied.  Let 
i,=max(iEI(u(i,n)>e}  and  io=max{jEJIu(j,n)~e}. 
Then  either 
io-  I 
.FN  i;,  v(i,  n)  GnFN  j!,  VU  n)  Q  1  f  v(i,  n)  (12) 
ncN  i=l 
with 
u(i,,  n) =  e  if  the  last  inequality  is strict, 
or  else 
.FN  Tz:  VU, n) 6  .FN  ;;I  v(i,  n) G  C  f  v(L  4  (13) 
nsNj=l 
with 
u(&,  n) =  e  if  the  last  inequality  is strict. 
To  see  that  either  (12)  or  (13)  must  be  satisfied  suppose  the  contrary. 
There  are  several  possible  cases to  be  considered.  It  may  be  that  one  of the 
inequalities  in  both  (12)  and  (13)  is violated.  In  that  case either 
(14) 
nsN  j=l 
or 
ntN,=l 
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Suppose  (14)  holds.  For  some  small  E >  0 and  some  large  NE  N, 
and 
For  n 6  N  and  all  c1  sufficiently  large,  u,(i,  n) <  e for  i >  i,  and  v,(j,  n) >  e 
for j  <  j,,.  Consequently,  for  all  a  sufficiently  large  there  must  be  a surplus 
of  sellers  of  measure  2~  or  more  at  date  N.  Since  the  measure  of  buyers 
entering  after  N  is  bounded  by  E we have  #,(j,  N)  2  4 for  some j  <  j,  and  CI 
sufficiently  large.  In  the  limit  as CY  +  1, b(j,  N)  2  $ for  somej  <  j,.  Since  N  is 
arbitrary,  this  contradicts  Proposition  7.  By  an  exactly  similar  argument 
(15)  leads  to  contradiction.  This  shows  that  the  inequalities  in  either  (12) 
or  (13)  must  be  satisfied.  If  neither  (12)  nor  (13)  holds  it  must  be  because 
the  complementary  slackness  conditions  are  not  satitied.  Suppose  then  that 
the  inequalities  in  (12)  hold,  the  second  one  strictly,  but  v(io,  n)  >  e. By  the 
preceding  argument  one  again  shows  there  is  a  permanent  surplus  of 
buyers  of types  i<  i.  which  contradicts  Proposition  7.  (13)  is  established 
the  same  way. 
The  following  theorem  has  been  proved. 
THEOREM  1.  Let  UL  Pd  b  e  a  sequence  of  perfect  equilibria  for  an 
economy  with  a finite  measure  of agents  and  a positive  entry  fee.  If  (v, p)  is a 
limit  point  of the sequence  then  (v,  ,u)  is  Walrasian  in  the sense  that,  for  some 
price  w, 
u(i, n)>e*v(i,  n)=si-c0 
u(j,  n)  >  e *  u(j,  n)  =  0  -  tj 
and  the  market-clearing  conditions  (12)  and  (13)  are  satisfied. 
6.  ECONOMIES WITH  INFINITE  MEASURE:  STEADY  STATES 
The  analysis  of economies  with  finite  measure  can  be  treated  as a  non- 
tatonnement  theory  of how an  economy  reaches  the  Walrasian  equilibrium. 
This  kind  of theory  is  useful  for  some  purposes  but  it  is  not  well  suited  to 
describing  a market  which  operates  in  real  time.  An  obvious  feature  of the 
economy  with  a finite  measure  of agents  is that  the  population  is eventually 
depleted.  In  actual  markets  the  number  of active  participants  may  fluctuate 46  DOUGLAS  GALE 
but  there  is  no  long-run  tendency  for  the  population  to  disappear.  On 
average,  departing  agents  are  balanced  by  newcomers.  Incorporating  this 
fact  into  the  present  framework  means  that  the  measure  of  all  the  agents 
who  are  active  in  the  economy  at  some  date  is infinite.  To  analyse  this  case 
in  the  most  general  terms  is  difficult.  Because  the  measure  of  buyers  and 
sellers,  summed  over  all  dates,  is  infinite,  attainability  conditions  are 
meaningless.  It  is  the  absence  of  these  conditions,  which  were  used  exten- 
sively  in  the  finite  case, that  explains  the  greater  difficulty  of analysing  the 
economy  with  infinite  measure.  In  special  cases,  however,  the  analysis  is 
quite  tractable.  If  we  restrict  the  analysis  to  steady  states  it  is  easy  to 
characterize  the  limit  points  of sequences  of perfect  equilibria. 
Two  kinds  of  steady  state  analysis  are  possible,  differing  only  in  the 
assumptions  made  about  entry.  The  first  kind  makes  use of an  assumption 
introduced  by  Rubinstein-Wolinsky  [ 131.  At  the  first  date  (n =  0)  there  is 
an  exogenously  determined  distribution  of  types  denoted  by  p,,.  These 
agents  are  all  active  (there  is no  cost  to  entering  the  market).  At  each  sub- 
sequent  date  agents  leave  the  market  in  pairs,  one  buyer  for  every  seller. 
The  crucial  assumption  is  that  every  agent  who  leaves  the  market  is 
immediately  replaced  by  an  agent  of  the  same  type.  Thus,  at  each  date 
n E N  the  distribution  of active  agents  is 
In  this  case it  is  convenient  to  assume  there  is  no  entry  fee: e =  0. 
Let  (u, p)  be  a limit  point  of a sequence  {u,,  cl,}  aE A of perfect  equilibria 
as described  in  Section  4.  If  (1)  is  satilied  for  every  a E A  it  will  obviously 
be  satisfied  in  the  limit.  The  results  obtained  in  Section  4  clearly  apply  to 
this  case too.  From  the  Corollary  to  Proposition  3 and  the  definition  of the 
matching  probabilities,  it  is  immediate  that  the  value  function  is  time- 
invariant.  To  be  more  precise,  for  any  h E H  such  that  pO(h) >  0, 
o(h,n)=u(h,n+l)  for  all  nE  N.  (2) 
We  might  as well  drop  the  time  subscripts  and  write  u(h)  for  u(h, n),  etc., 
where  there  is no  risk  of confusion.  From  Proposition  3 itself  we know  that 
for  any  i E I  and  j  E J  such  that  pO(i) >  0  and  &j)  >  0, 
44  +  u(j)  2  si -  t,.  (3) 
In  order  to  prove  the  converse  of  (3)  it  is  necessary  to  prove  a  stronger 
result,  namely,  that  for  each  a E A,  the  value  functions  u,  are  unique  and,  in 
an  appropriate  sense, stationary. 
If  the  relation  described  by  Eq.  (1)  is  assumed  to  hold  for  every  a E A 
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n  is  independent  of  c1 and  n.  We  can  write,  without  loss  of  generality, 
P,(h,  n) =P(h),  f  or  any  h E H,  n E N  and  CI EA.  The  recursive  equations  in 
Proposition  1 can  be  restated  as 
1-t  1  p(j)  u,(i,  n+  1) 
isJ  > 
+  4 C  p(j)  IllaX{  d(Si-  tj)  -  U,(j,  n  +  11, U9(t  fi +  1)) 
jeJ 
(4) 
for  neN  and  iEIand 
u,(j,n)=  ( 1-1CP(i) v,(j,n+l) 
iel  ) 
+$  Cp(i)max(cr”(s,-t,)-v,(i,n+  l),  v,(j,n+  1))  (5) 
itl 
for  no  N  and  jeJ 
PROPOSITION  9.  For  any  a E A  there  exists  a  unique value function  v, 
which is stationary  in  the sense  that  v,(h,  n +  1) =  av,(h,  n) for  every  h E H 
andnEN. 
ProoJ  For  any  h E H  and  n E N,  let  M,(h,  n)  denote  the  supremum  of 
u,(h, n)  taken  over  all  functions  u,  satisfying  equations  (4)  and  (5)  and  the 
feasibility  condition  0 <  v,(h,  n) <  a”(s,  -  t,)  for  the  given  matching 
probabilities  p.  Similarly  for  any  h E H  and  nE N  let  m,(h,  n)  denote  the 
inlimum  of v,(h,  n) taken  over  all  functions  v,  satisfying  (4)  and  (5)  and  the 
feasibility  condition.  It  is  clear  from  inspection  of  (4)  and  (5)  that 
M,(h,  n +  1) =  aM,(h,  n)  and  m,(h,  n +  1) =  am,(h,  n).  Thus,  (4)  implies 
that  for  any  i E I  and  n E N, 
mdi,  n)  2  1  -  4  1  p(j)  m,(i,  n  +  1) 
JEJ  > 
++  1  p(j)  max(a”(sj-  t,)-M,(j,  n+  11, m,(i,  n+  I)} 
jcJ 
+  5 1  max{  an(si  -  tj) -  aM,(j,  n), am,(i,  n)}  (6) 
jcJ 
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and 
M,(i,n)<  1-i  Cp(j) 
( 
M,(i,n+l) 
jcJ  > 
+  +  1  p(j)  max(a”(s,  -  Ii)  -  m,(j,  n +  l),  M,(i,  n +  1)) 
/eJ 
=  1 -  +  C  p(j) 
( 
aM,(i,  n) 
jsJ  > 
+  f  C  p(j)  max(a”(si-  tj)  -  am,&,  n), aM,(i,  n)}.  (7) 
jsJ 
Subtracting  (6)  from  (7)  and  rearranging  yields 
[  ( 
1 -a  1 -  t  1  Ai)  (M,(i,  n) -  m,(i,  n)) 
jeJ  )I 
<  f 1  p(j)  max{a”(s;-  fj)  -  am,(j,  n),  aM,(i,  n)) 
jeJ 
-+,;Jp(j)  maX(a”(s,-  fj)  -aM,(j,  HI,  am,(i,  n)f 
Gi  2  p(j)max(crlIM,(hn)-m,(j,n)l,  aCM,(Ln)-m,(kn)l}.  (8) 
jtJ 
By  analogous  reasoning  a  similar  inequality  is  derived  for  j  E J  and  any 
n E N.  Suppose  that  for  some  i E I 
M,(i,  n)  -  m,(i,  n)  =  yea;  (M,(h,  n)  -m,(h,  II)>. 
Then  the  preceding  inequality  (8)  implies  that 
MAi,  n)  - m,(i,  n) 
>I 
-1 
a f C  AACM,(h  n) -  m,(i,  n)], 
jeJ 
which  implies  that  M,(i,  n) =m,(i,  n)  since,  by  definition,  M,(i,  n) > 
mcr(i, n),  both  are  finite  and 
(l/2) CzU  a 
l-a(l-(W)X~W)<l’ 
A  similar  argument  works  for  the  case  where  some  jc  J  maximizes 
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u,(h,  n) <  M,(h,  n)  and  the  stationarity  property  follows  from 
M,(h,  n +  1) =  aM,(h,  n).  1 
PROPOSITION  10.  For  any  i E Z and j E J  such that  o(i) > 0  and  u(j) > 0, 
u(i) + u(j)  = si  -  tj. 
Proof:  Suppose  that  for  some  i E I  and  all j  E J,  o(i)  +  u(j)  >  si -  t,.  Then 
for  any  n E N  and  G(  sufliciently  large, 
u,(i,  n +  1) +  o,(j,  n +  1) > cI”(sj -  ti)  for  all  jE  J. 
By  stationarity  this  means  that  i  is  unable  to  trade  with  any  Jo  J  at  any 
date  n E N.  But  this  means  u,(i,  n +  1) =  0,  and  in  the  limit  v(i)  =  0. Thus  for 
any  i E I  such  that  u(i)  >  0  there  exists  Jo  J  such  that  u(i)  +  u(j)  d  si -  t,. 
Then  Il/(i,  j,  n) =p(j)  >  0  for  all  n E N  and  this  implies  #(i,  GO)  =  0.  By  the 
argument  used  in  Section  5,  &i  -  1, co) =  0  implies  that  A,u(i)  = Ais,.  An 
exactly  similar  argument  shows  that  if  v(j+  I)>0  then  A,u(j)=  -Ait,. 
Let  i,  (resp. j,)  be  the  largest  value  of i E I  (resp. Jo  J)  such  that  u(i)  >  0 
(resp. u(j)  >  0).  We  know  that  u(i,)  +  o(j,)  as,  -  t,,.  Since  A;u(i)  = Ais,  for 
i<  i,  and  Aiu(j)  =  -Ait,  for  j<  j,,,  if  the  inequality  were  strict  it  would 
imply  that  u(i)  +  u(j)  >  si -  t,  for  all  i E 2 and  j  E J,  a  contradiction.  Thus, 
u(i,)  -t- u(j,)  =  s,” -  t,,  and  so  u(i)  +  u(j)  =  s, -  t,  for  all  (i, j)  <  (iO, j,)  as 
claimed.  1 
It  is immediate  from  Proposition  10 that  there  exists  a “price”  o  2  0 such 
that  for  any  i E Z, 
u(i)=max(sj-w,O) 
and  for  any je  J, 
u(j)  = max{w  -  tj,  O}. 
Typically  the  situation  will  be  as  described  in  Fig.  1 where  the  marginal 
trading  types  on  each  side  of  the  market  receive  positive  utility. 
Generically,  this  is  not  a  Walrasian  equilibrium  relative  to  1~~ because 
demand  does  not  equal  supply.  Still  the  fact  that  there  is a  single  uniform 
price  at  which  all  trades  take  place  is  important  in  its  own  right.  It  con- 
firms  the  claim  made  by  RW  in  [13]  that  their  model  provides  a theory  of 
price  formation.  This  claim  could  not  be  tested  in  the  context  of  their 
original  example  because  it  was too  rudimentary  to  discriminate  between 
price  and  non-price  outcomes. 
Proposition  10  only  tells  us  that  a  price  exists  at  which  all  trades  take 
place.  It  does  not  tell  us how the  price  is  determined.  The  next  proposition 
enables  us  to  derive  the  price  w from  knowledge  of  the  steady-state 
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PROPOSITION  11.  C,,,p(i)  u(i)  =cjEJp(j)  v(j). 
Proof:  From  Proposition  10 and  the  recursive  equations  (4)  and  (5)  we 
know  that  for  any  c1  E A  and  i E I, 
(l-a)u,(i,O)=$  Cp(j)  crmax{si-ti-u,(i,O)-~,(j,O),0}. 
isf 
Multiplying  both  sides  by  p(i)  and  summing  over  i E I  gives 
1  (1 -alp(i)  u,(i, 0) 
it 1 
A  symmetrical  argument  shows  that 
C  (1  -a)&)  u,(j,  0) 
jeJ 
=  t c 1 P(i)  P(j)  a  max(s;-  tj-  u,(i,  0)  -  u,(j,  0),  O}. 
iEIj6.l 
Since  a<l, 
for  any  a E A.  Taking  limits  as a --+ 1 gives  the  required  result.  1 
Roughly  speaking  this  proposition  tells  us  that  the  sums  of the  expected 
utilities  on  each  side  of  the  market  at  a  given  date  are  equal.  This  is,  of 
course,  a  consequence  of  assuming  that  ail  agents  have  the  same  rate  of 
time  preference.  That  assumption,  which  is  innocuous  in  other  respects,  is 
crucial  here.  If,  for  example,  sellers  were  more  impatient  than  buyers  the 
sum  of  their  expected  utilities  at  a  given  date  would  be  smaller  than  the 
buyers’.  And  by  varying  their  relative  discount  factors  we could  generate 
any  desired  distribution  of  surplus  between  the  two  sides  of  the  market. 
Proposition  11 is  the  analogue  of the  result  obtained  by  RW  in  [13].  Like 
their  result  it  seems inconsistent  with  Walrasian  equilibrium.  To  be  precise, 
the  steady  state  distribution  p,, defines  an  exchange  economy  which  has  a 
unique  Walrasian  equilibrium  price.  There  is no  reason  to  think  that  that 
price  is the  same  as the  value  of o  determined  by  Proposition  11. And  if by 
chance  it  were,  varying  the  relative  discount  rates  would  vary  w without 
altering  the  “Walrasian”  price.  In  short,  o  is  not  except  by  sheer  coin- 
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More  formally,  let  us  write  u E W(p,)  if  there  exists  a  price  w L  0  such 
that  u(i)=max{si-o,O}  for  FEZ  and  u(j)=max{o-tj,O}  forjEJ  and 
the  following  market-clearing  condition  is  satisfied:  either  C;O=~,’ p,,(i)  6 
E,‘“=,  p,(j)  ,< Cf=  1 &i)  with  u(&)  =  e  if  the  last  inequality  is  strict  or 
Ix&’  p,(j)  <C?=  ’  pO(i)  <  cp=  1 p,(j)  with  v(j,)  =  e if the  last  inequality  is 
strict,  where  i,=max(iEZIU(i)2e)  and  j,=max{jEJIu(j)>e}.  If 
Z~E  W(pO)  we  say  that  u  is  Walrasian  with  respect  to  ,uO.  The  formal 
conclusion  of the  preceding  discussion  is  the  following  theorem. 
THEOREM  2.  Let  (u,,  ,u,)  be  a  sequence  of  perfect  equilibria  .for  an.1 
economy  with  a steady-state  distribution  of agents  ,uL,(  ., n) =  ,uO  for  all  N and 
n.  Zf (v, p)  is  a  limit  point  of  this  sequence  then  for  some  values  CI~ pO, 
U$  W(pO)  because  the  market  clearing  conditions  are  violated. 
One  can  also  define  a flow  equilibrium.  In  this  particular  case any  price 
is  market-clearing  in  the  flow sense since  by  assumption  buyers  and  sellers 
flow into  and  out  of the  market  in  equal  numbers.  And  this  is  exactly  what 
is  required  since,  as we have  seen,  any  price  can  be  generated  by  altering 
the  relative  rates  of time  preference.  In  this  example,  the  flow  equilibrium 
concept  seems somewhat  unhelpful.  The  price  w is determined  by  the  stock 
of  agents  pLo together  with  the  condition  in  Proposition  11,  whereas  the 
flow market-clearing  condition  determines  nothing.  Indeed  it  cannot  deter- 
mine  anything  since  it  is  always  trivially  satisfied.  However,  these  proper- 
ties  of the  model  seem  to  arise  from  the  fact  that,  by  assumption,  the  flows 
into  the  market  are  always  balanced  and  hence  the  stock  of agents  in  the 
market  is effectively  exogenous. 
To  test  this  hypothesis,  consider  a  different  set  of  entry  assumptions. 
Suppose  that  at  each  date  n E N  there  is  a  constant  stream  of  potential 
entrants  represented  by  the  measure  vO. In  terms  of the  earlier  notation.  for 
each  no  N, 
V(.> n) =  \pO.  (9) 
It  is  clearly  impossible  to  have  a  steady  state  unless  agents  who  cannot 
trade  are excluded  from  the  market.  Assume  there  is a small  entry  fee e >  0. 
Then  agents  must  choose  whether  or  not  to  enter  the  market.  As  before, 
consider  a  sequence  {(v,,  pJ}creA  of perfect  equilibria  with  limit  (u, ,u) and 
suppose  that  for  each  CXEA,  the  matching  probabilities  p,  are  time- 
invariant,  that  is, 
PA.,  n) =p,(.,  n +  1)  for  all’  n E N.  (10) 
Clearly  (10)  implies  the  same  property  holds  in  the  limit  as c(  +  1. 
Propositions  9,  10,  and  11  continue  to  hold  under  the  revised  entry 
assumption  (9)  since  the  only  property  of  ,u,  used  in  the  proofs  is 52  DOUGLASGALE 
stationarity,  which  continues  to  hold  by  assumption.  Now,  however,  an 
additional  condition  must  be  satisfied.  Since  buyers  and  sellers  leave  the 
market  in  equal  numbers  they  must  enter  in  equal  numbers  to  maintain  a 
stationary  equilibrium.  This  is  the  flow  market-clearing  condition  and  it 
implies  conditions  analogous  to  (5.15)  and  (5.16).  Let  i,,= 
max{iEZI.ri>~+e}  and  j,=max{jEJItj<~-e}.  Then  one  of  the 
following  must  hold. 
Either 
io-  I 
C  vdi)  d  f  v,(j)  6  2  vO(i), 
i=l  .j=  I  i=  I 
with si,, =  cu  +  e if the last  inequality  is strict,  (11) 
or 
io-  1 
j:,  b(j)  6  2  v,(i)  d  f  vdj) 
i=  I  j=l 
with  t,  =  CJ.I  -  e if the last  inequality  is strict.  (12) 
The  proof  is similar  to  the  one  given  at  the  end  of Section  5 and  will  not  be 
repeated  here. 
THEOREM  3.  Let  (II,,  p,)  be  a  sequence  of  perfect  equilibria  for  an 
economy  with  a  constant  stream  of  potential  entrants  v( ., n) =  v0 for  all  n 
and  a small  entry  fee  e >  0.  If  px( ., n)  =  p0 for  all  c1  and n and  (u, p)  is a limit 
point  of  the  sequence  then  v is  Walrasian  in  the  sense that  v E W(v,). 
Conditions  (11)  and  (12)  generically  define  a  unique  price  w which  in 
turn  determines  everything  of interest  about  the  limit  point  (v, p).  In  other 
words  the  data  in  v0 determine  the  limit  of the  perfect  equilibria.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  steady  state  distribution  ~1  determines  nothing  of interest. 
Proposition  11  continues  to  hold  but  it  tells  us  nothing.  The  payoffs  to 
individual  agents  are  determined  independently  of  the  condition  in 
Proposition  11 and  it  is satisfied  entirely  by  adjustments  in  ~1.  What  then  is 
the  relationship  between  p,  vO, and  o?  It  follows  directly  from  the  steady- 
state  assumption  and  the  matching  rules  that  the  distribution  of entrants  at 
each  date  must  be  proportional  to  the  distribution  of agents  in  the  market. 
More  precisely,  there  exists  scalars  A,  and  A2 such  that 
2, cl(i, n) = vo(i)  (i <  iO)  (13) 
h4.L  n) =  hdj)  (j  <id.  (14) LIMIT  THEOREMS  53 
In  the  case of the  marginal  types  iQ and  j,, 
l,cl(io,  n) =min  vo(j)  (15) 
b4j,,  n)  =min  (16) 
Obviously  ~(i,  n) =  0 =  p(j,  n)  for  i >  i,  and  j  >  j,.  To  ensure  that  ,U is  time 
invariant  the  measure  of  departing  agents  of  each  type  must  equal  the 
measure  of entering  agents.  For  example,  the  number  of departing  agents  of 
type  i=  1 is  ~(1’=  1, n)  p(J).  (This  requires  separate  proof  that  all  pairs  of 
agents  (i, i)  =  (1, j)  who  meet  actually  trade).  So  assuming  i0 >  1, we have 
v,(i=  l)=p(i=  1, n)p(J)=p(i=  1, n)p(J,  n)/p(H,  n).  (17) 
Substituting  from  (13)  into  (17)  we see that 
4  = N,  n)IAfc  n).  (18) 
A  similar  argument  shows  that 
4  = Pu(A  n)lAfL  n).  (19) 
Then  (18)  and  (19)  imply  1,  +  1,  =  1. Thus  p  is determined,  up  to  a  scalar, 
by  (13-16)  in  terms  of  v,, and  o.  The  scalar  which  remains  to  be  deter- 
mined  (AI /&)  is  fixed  by  Proposition  11.  The  ratio  of  buyers  to  sellers  is 
adjusted  so  that  the  sums  of  expected  utilities  on  the  two  sides  of  the 
market  are  equal.  In  this  precise  sense Proposition  12 has  content:  it  only 
determines  the  size  of the  queue  and  has  no  effect on  individual  payoffs. 
To  sum  up,  under  the  entry  assumption  (9)  the  limiting  price  w is deter- 
mined  by  vO, theflow  of potential  entrants,  and  by  theflow  market-clearing 
conditions  (11)  and  (12).  The  stock  of agents  in  the  market  p  is determined 
up  to  a scalar  by  v0 and  w. Nothing  of interest  depends  on  ,U in  the  limiting 
economy. 
These  formal  results,  taken  together  with  those  for  non-steady  states, 
argue  strongly  that  the  flow concept  of market-clearing  is  the  appropriate 
one.  It  is  the  rather  special  properties  of  the  RW  model  which  make  the 
stock  concept  seem  more  appropriate  there  and  hence  generate  the 
paradox. 54  DOUGLAS  GALE 
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